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The uncovered interest rate parity equation is the cornerstone of most models in
international macro. However, this equation does not hold empirically since the
forward discount, or interest rate diﬀerential, is negatively related to the subse-
quent change in the exchange rate. This forward discount puzzle implies that
excess returns on foreign currency investments are predictable. In this paper we
investigate to what extent incomplete information processing can explain this puz-
zle. We consider two types of incompleteness: infrequent and partial information
processing. We calibrate a two-country general equilibrium model to the data
and show that incomplete information processing can fully match the empirical
evidence. It can also account for several related empirical phenomena, including
that of “delayed overshooting”. We show that incomplete information processing
is consistent both with evidence that little capital is devoted to actively managing
short-term currency positions and with a small welfare gain from active portfolio
management. The gain is small because exchange rate changes are very hard to
predict. The welfare gain is easily outweighed by a small cost of active portfolio
management.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the best established and most resilient puzzles in international ﬁnance is the
forward discount puzzle.1 Fama (1984) illuminated the problem with a regression
of the monthly change in the exchange rate on the preceding one-month forward
premium. The uncovered interest rate parity equation, which is the cornerstone of
many models in international macro, implies a coeﬃcient of one. But surprisingly
Fama found a negative coeﬃcient for each of nine diﬀerent currencies. A currency
whose interest rate is high tends to appreciate. This implies that high interest
rate currencies have predictably positive excess returns. The relationship between
excess returns and interest rate diﬀerentials is illustrated in Table 1 for ﬁve cur-
rencies against the U.S. dollar. A regression of the quarterly excess return on a
foreign currency on the diﬀerence between the U.S. and foreign interest rate yields
coeﬃcients ranging from -1.5 to -4.2 Moreover, as we document below, interest rate
diﬀerentials continue to negatively predict the excess returns ﬁve to ten quarters
ahead.
Most models assume that investors incorporate instantaneously all new infor-
mation in their portfolio decisions. To explain the forward premium puzzle, we
depart from this assumption. There are many types of costs associated with active
portfolio management, whereby portfolios are adjusted at high frequency based on
all available information. If investors delegate these decisions to ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, some of the direct costs incurred are replaced by fees, as well as agency
and monitoring costs. The fees charged by active portfolio managers tend to be
substantial.3 For the purpose of our analysis we therefore take as given that there
1For surveys see Lewis (1995), Engel (1996), or Sarno (2005). Some of the more recent
contributions include Backus, Foresi and Telmer (2001), Beakert, Hodrick and Marshall (1997),
Chaboud and Wright (2005), Chinn and Meredith (2005), Chinn and Frankel (2002), Fisher
(2005), Flood and Rose (2002), Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), Mark and Wu (1998), Sarno,
Valente and Leon (2006) and Verdelhan (2005).
2While there are potential statistical problems in these predictability regressions (mainly small
sample bias and bias caused by the persistence of the forward discount), these problems usually
can only explain a part of the total bias. See, for example, Stambaugh (1999), Campbell and
Yogo (2006), or Liu and Maynard (2005).
3There is no established statistic on management fees. But everything indicates that active
portfolio managers, such as hedge funds, charge fees that are often well above 2% of invested
funds. An interesting question is why these fees are high. They are likely to reﬂect three
1are some non-negligible costs associated with active portfolio management.
Incomplete information processing can take two diﬀerent forms: (i) infrequent
information processing, where investors make portfolio decisions infrequently, and
(ii) partial information processing, where investors use only a subset of all available
information. We will argue that there is extensive evidence on both. We examine
the impact of incomplete information processing in a simple two-country general
equilibrium model that is calibrated to data for the ﬁve currencies in Table 1.
Agents are fully rational given the constraints they face (including the costs). We
show that even for a quite small cost of making portfolio decisions, most investors
do not ﬁnd it in their interest to actively exploit all available information. We ﬁnd
that such a framework can account for both the sign and size of forward discount
bias illustrated in Table 1.
There are two distinct features that are surprising in the forward discount
anomaly. The ﬁrst aspect is the consistent sign of the bias. Why would the excess
return be high for currencies whose interest rate is relatively high? This can be ex-
plained by infrequent information processing by investors. Froot and Thaler (1990)
and Lyons (2001) have informally argued that models where some agents are slow
in responding to new information may explain the forward discount puzzle. The
argument is quite simple. An increase in the interest rate of a particular currency
will lead to an increase in demand for that currency and therefore an appreciation
of the currency. But when investors make infrequent portfolio decisions, they will
continue to buy the currency as time goes on. This can cause a continuing appre-
ciation of the currency. This is consistent with the evidence documented by Fama
(1984) that an increase in the interest rate leads to a subsequent appreciation. It
also implies that a higher interest rate raises the expected excess return of the
currency.
Infrequent information processing can also explain the dynamic response of
currency depreciation, or excess returns, to changes in interest rates. Interestingly,
elements: (i) the costs associated with collecting and processing information, computing the
optimal portfolio, and attracting and distributing funds, (ii) proﬁt margins due to their ﬁnancial
expertise and product diﬀerentiation and (iii) a proﬁt sharing component intended to deﬂect
agency and monitoring costs. There exists a substantial literature investigating the compensation
of porftolio managers. See for example Berk and Green (2005) or Dybvig, Farnsworth and
Carpenter (2004) and references therein.
2predictability is not restricted to horizons of a month or a quarter: the forward
discount at time t can also predict excess returns at future dates. This feature is
typically overlooked in the literature. Consider a regression of a future three-month
excess return qt+k,f r o mt+k−1t ot+k, on the current interest rate diﬀerential it−
i∗
t. Figure 1 shows the evidence for the ﬁve countries in Table 1, where k increases
from 1 to 30. There is signiﬁcant predictability with a negative sign for ﬁve to ten
quarters. Over longer horizons, however, the slope coeﬃcient becomes insigniﬁcant
or even positive. This is consistent with ﬁndings that uncovered interest parity
h o l d sb e t t e ra tl o n g e rh o r i z o n s . 4 The persistence in the predictability of excess
returns is related to the phenomenon of delayed overshooting. Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995) ﬁrst documented that after an interest rate increase, a currency
continues to appreciate for another 8 to 12 quarters before it starts to depreciate.5
As pointed out above, this is exactly what one expects to happen when investors
make infrequent portfolio decisions.
The second surprising aspect of the forward premium puzzle is that investors do
not exploit the predictability of excess returns. The standard explanation is that
an excess return reﬂects a risk premium. But many surveys written on the forward
discount puzzle have concluded that explanations for the forward discount puzzle
related to time-varying risk premia have all fallen short.6 Our analysis shows
that, given the high risk involved, a small asset management cost discourages
investors from exploiting the predictability.7 This risk is illustrated in Figure 2,
which shows for one currency, the DM/$, a scatter plot of the excess return on
DM against the U.S. minus German interest rate diﬀerential. The negative slope of
the regression line represents predictability. It is clear though that predictability is
largely overshadowed by risk.8 Since there is so much uncertainty, potential welfare
gains from actively exploiting the predictability are very small and can easily be
4See for example Chinn and Meredith (2005), Boudoukh et al. (2005), or Chinn (2006).
5Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) explain both predictability and delayed overshooting with
distorted beliefs on the interest rate process.
6See Lewis (1995) or Engel (1996). Recently Verdelhan (2005) has more success based on a
model with time-varying risk aversion due to habit formation.
7Verdelhan (2004) shows that foreign exchange excess returns lead to small and unstable
Sharpe ratios in the short-term.
8More formally, this is reﬂected in the low R2 for excess return regressions in Table 1, which
is on average 0.09.
3outweighed by portfolio management costs. This means that for many investors
it is simply not worthwhile to actively trade on excess return predictability. Even
for those who do actively trade on the excess return predictability, the high risk
limits the positions they will take. We will show in the context of the model that
a small fraction of ﬁnancial wealth actively devoted to forward bias trade will not
unravel the impact of infrequent decision making.
It is the combination of infrequent and partial information processing that is
key to our results. Infrequent information processing by itself leads to predictabil-
ity of the right sign, but does not fully match the data quantitatively. On the
other hand, partial information processing by itself does not lead to predictability.
We ﬁnd that it is the combination of the two perspectives that matches the data
very closely. The distinction between partial use of information and infrequent
information processing is also found in the recent literature on rational inatten-
tion (or inattentiveness) in macro models. One strand of the literature, based on
Sims (1998, 2003), considers continuous but partial information processing due to
(Shannon) capacity constraints. In another strand of the literature, e.g., Mankiw
and Reis (2002), there are time-dependent decision rules, where information is
processed infrequently.9 Although the two types of approaches are related, they
have a diﬀerent impact in an asset pricing context.
Our theoretical analysis is also related to recent developments in the stock
market literature.10 On the one hand, several studies show how asset allocation is
aﬀected by predictability.11 On the other hand, some recent papers examine the
9There is a growing literature in macroeconomics based on rational inattention, in particular
in the context of price setting by ﬁrms and consumption decisions by households. Examples
of papers where agents process partial information due to information capacity constraints are
Sims (1998, 2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2005). Examples of papers where agents
process information infrequently due to explicit information processing costs are Begg and Im-
perato (2001), Bonomo and de Carvalho (2003), Moscarini (2004), and Reis (2004a,b). Carroll
(2003), Dupor and Tsuruga (2005) and Mankiw and Reis (2002) assume exogenously that new
information arrives, and is processed, at a certain rate (either with a ﬁxed probability or at ﬁxed
intervals).
10Evidence of excess return predictability has been extensively documented for stock and bond
markets (e.g. see Cochrane, 1999).
11See for example Kandel and Stambaugh (1996), Campbell and Viceira (1999), or Barberis
(2000).
4impact of infrequent portfolio decisions due to limited attention in asset markets.12
However, the literature has not linked predictability with infrequent trading: those
papers that examine the impact of predictability assume it exogenous, while pa-
pers that examine infrequent portfolio decisions do not examine its impact on asset
prices. Our paper departs from the existing literature by incorporating both pre-
dictability and infrequent portfolio decisions and by showing that the latter can
cause the former. Our methodological contribution to the literature is to solve
endogenously for an asset price in a model with time-varying expected returns.
To what extent do the assumptions of infrequent and partial information pro-
cessing match the behavior of investors? It is well known that individual investors
make infrequent portfolio decisions. The Investment Company Institute (2002)
reports that of U.S. investors who have mutual fund investments or hold stock
directly, 60% made no transactions in 2001.13 As many as 85% of investors re-
port that they follow a buy-and-hold strategy. Systematic evidence is typically
n o tr e c o r d e df o rt h ef o r e i g ne x c h a n g em a r ket, but trade in the foreign exchange
market is closely related to international trade in stocks, bonds and other assets.
Infrequent portfolio reallocation across markets is consistent with the evidence
of Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001). They show that cross-country equity
ﬂows react with lags to a change in returns, while the contemporaneous reaction
is muted.
Moreover, there are indications that the size of the market that actively trades
on expected excess return opportunities in currency markets is only a tiny fraction
of cross border ﬁnancial holdings. This market consists of hedge funds exploiting
forward discount bias and ﬁnancial institutions that provide such services to indi-
vidual clients.14 Interviews that we have conducted with ﬁnancial institutions that
conduct these trades suggest that worldwide the capital devoted to it is currently
about $200 billion. This is only 0.3% of global cross border ﬁnancial holdings and
12Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Lynch (1996), and Gabaix and Laibson (2002) have all developed
models where investors make infrequent portfolio decisions because of a ﬁxed cost of information
collection and decision making.
13For a discussion of evidence on infrequent trading see Bilias et al. (2005) and Vissing-
Jorgenson (2004).
14The latter include currency overlay managers, commodity trading advisors and leveraged
funds oﬀered by established asset management ﬁrms. See Sager and Taylor (2006) for a recent
description of the foreign exchange market.
5even far less as a fraction of overall ﬁnancial wealth (in 2004 external assets were
$56.6 trillion). Mutual funds do not actively exploit excess returns on foreign in-
vestment since these funds only trade within a certain asset class and cannot freely
switch between domestic and foreign assets.15 Lyons (2001) points out that as a
result of the excessive risks involved most large ﬁnancial institutions do not even
devote their own proprietary capital to currency strategies based on the forward
discount bias.16
Regarding the partial use of information, anecdotal evidence suggests that even
the most active traders use only a very small fraction of the available information to
predict future exchange rates. Interviews with institutions that actively conduct
speculative trades exploiting the forward discount bias suggests that exchange
rate expectations are formed based on very simple rules. Many institutions do not
bother forecasting at all and expect the future spot rate to be the same as the
current spot rate. Other institutions use a simple factor model, with four or ﬁve
factors, to predict future exchange rates. These factors may include the forward
discount or interest rate diﬀerential, equity returns, some measure of risk-appetite
and past currency changes. Others mainly use some form of technical analysis.
There is no uniform practice in developing these forecasts and at most a very small
subset of the available information space is used. This is not surprising because
of the well-known diﬃculty in consistently outperforming the random walk when
predicting exchange rate changes over short horizons.17 It is likely that investors
making infrequent decisions about currency holdings process even less information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a two-
country general equilibrium model where all investors make infrequent portfolio
decisions. The model is calibrated to data for the ﬁve currencies in Table 1. In
section 3 we discuss the implications of the model for the forward discount and
delayed overshooting puzzles. We also consider an extension of the model to partial
information processing and to investors that actively manage their portfolio each
15This may be partly endogenous since we show that the gains from actively reallocating the
portfolio between diﬀerent currencies is small.
16Banks, which are the most active institutions on the foreign exchange market, do not conduct
these trades either. Two thirds of trade in the foreign exchange market is done among banks
that are foreign exchange dealers (BIS, 2004). While these dealers follow the markets very closely
during the course of a trading day, they hold little foreign exchange overnight.
17S e eM e e s ea n dR o g o ﬀ (1983) and more recently Cheung et al.(2005).
6period. Section 4 relates our analysis to the existing literature on the forward
discount puzzle. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Infrequent Decision Making
In this section we present a model of the foreign exchange market where investors
make infrequent portfolio decisions. We ﬁrst describe the basic structure of the
model and the solution method. We then discuss under what cost of active portfolio
management it is optimal for all investors to make infrequent portfolio decisions.
Some technical details are covered in the Appendix, with a Technical Appendix
available on request providing full technical detail.
2.1 Model’s Description
2.1.1 Basic Setup
We develop a one good, two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model. Our
overall approach is to keep the model as simple as possible while retaining the key
ingredients needed to highlight the role of infrequent decision making. There are
overlapping generations (OLG) of investors who each live T +1 periods and derive
utility from end-of-life wealth. Each period a total of n new investors are born,
e n d o w e dw i t ho n eu n i to ft h eg o o dt h a tc a nb ei n v e s t e di na s s e t sd e s c r i b e db e l o w .
We model the infrequent decision making by assuming that investors make only
one portfolio decision when born for the next T periods. Below we will derive the
threshold cost where it becomes optimal to make infrequent portfolio decisions.
This OLG setup is easier to work with than the alternative where agents have
inﬁnite horizons and make portfolio decisions every T periods. In that case we
also would have to solve for optimal savings-consumption decisions, which depend
on assumptions made about the frequency of those decisions. We have abstracted
from saving decisions by assuming that agents derive utility from end-of-life wealth.
This allows us to focus on portfolio decisions.18 We want to emphasize though that
18An inﬁnite horizon setup would complicate matters in other ways as well. The optimal
portfolio would be hard to compute since it depends on a hedge against changes in expected
returns. There would also be the standard complications associated with the stationarity of
wealth and the distribution of wealth.
7while such an inﬁnite horizon setup would be more complicated, the mechanisms at
work would be similar to that in our simpler OLG framework. The crucial element
is that information is incorporated gradually into portfolio decisions because only
a limited fraction of agents make new portfolio decisions each period. In both the
inﬁnite horizon and OLG setups a fraction 1/T of agents makes a new portfolio
decision each period. The fact that in the OLG setup these decisions are made by
a new “generation” of investors is of little relevance for what follows.
The model contains one good and three assets. In the goods market we assume
purchasing power parity: pt = st + p∗
t,w h e r ept is the log-price level of the good
i nt h eH o m ec o u n t r ya n dst the log of the nominal exchange rate. Foreign country
variables are indicated with a star. The three assets are one-period nominal bonds
in both currencies issued by the respective governments and a risk-free technology
with real return ¯ r.19 Bonds are in ﬁxed supply in the respective currencies.20
We ﬁrst describe the monetary policy rules adopted by central banks, then
optimal portfolio choice, and ﬁnally asset market clearing.
2.1.2 Monetary Policy
We assume that the Home country central bank commits to a constant price level.
This implies zero Home inﬂation, so that the Home nominal interest rate is it =¯ r.
The foreign interest rate is random, i∗
t = −ut where







The error term captures foreign monetary policy innovations. The forward discount
is:
fdt ≡ it − i
∗
t = ut +¯ r (2)
These assumptions imply that there are in essence only two assets, one with a
risk-free real return ¯ r and one with a stochastic real return. The latter is Foreign
bonds, which has a real return of st+1 − st + i∗
t. This setup leads to much simpler
19This is necessary to tie down the real interest rate since the model does not contain saving
and investment decisions.
20One can think of the governments that issue the bonds as owning claims on the riskfree
technology whose proceeds are suﬃcient to pay the interest on the debt. The remainder is
thrown in the water or spent on public goods that have no eﬀect on the marginal utility from
private consumption.
8portfolios than we would get under symmetric monetary policy rules, in which case
t h er e a lr e t u r no nH o m ea n dF o r e i g nb o n d sw o u l db o t hb es t o c h a s t i c . 21
2.1.3 Portfolio Choice
We now turn to the optimal portfolios. Since PPP holds, Foreign and Home in-
vestors face the same real returns and therefore choose the same portfolio. We
assume constant relative risk-aversion preferences over end-of-life consumption,
with a rate of relative risk-aversion of γ. Investors born at time t maximize
EtW
1−γ
t+T /(1−γ), where Wt+T is end-of-life ﬁnancial wealth that will be consumed.
Investors make only one portfolio decision when born, investing a fraction bI
t in









t+j is the gross investment return from t + j − 1t ot + j,
R
p








In order to solve for optimal portfolios we adopt a second order approximation
of log portfolio returns.23 We deﬁne qt+j+1 = st+j+1−st+j+i∗
t+j−it+j as the excess
return on Foreign bonds from t + j to t + j +1a n dqt,t+T = qt+1 + .. + qt+T as
t h ec u m u l a t i v ee x c e s sr e t u r nf r o mt to t + T.I nA p p e n d i xA . 1w es h o wt h a tt h e









where bI is a constant and σ2















21Without having to introduce nominal rigidities, from the point of view of the Home country
it also captures the fact that exchange rate risk is far more substantial than inﬂation risk.
22We assume that the portfolio share is held constant for T periods, which ﬁts reality better
than investors deciding on an entire path of portfolio shares for the next T periods.
23We maximize the objective function after replacing the log portfolio returns by their second
order approximation. An alternative solution method is to start from the ﬁrst order condition
for portfolio choice and then substitute a ﬁrst order approximation of the log portfolio return.
This gives the exact same solution. The latter is the approach adopted by Engel and Matsumoto
(2005) to solve for optimal portfolios in a general equilibrium model with home bias.
9The optimal portfolio therefore depends on the expected excess return over the
next T periods, with less aggressive portfolio choices made when either agents are
more risk averse or there is more uncertainty about future returns.
2.1.4 Liquidity Traders
There is another group of investors that we refer to as liquidity traders. These are
modeled exogenously. In the noisy rational expectations literature in ﬁnance it is
very common to introduce exogenous noise or liquidity traders since this noise pre-
vents the asset price from revealing the aggregate of private information. Here we
do not have private information, but the exogenous liquidity traders are introduced
to disconnect the exchange rate from observed macroeconomic shocks. It is well
known since Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) that observed macro fundamentals explain
very little of exchange rate volatility for horizons up to 1 or 2 years. This is what
Lyons (2001) has called the exchange rate determination puzzle. In the absence of
shocks to liquidity trade the exchange rate would only be driven by interest rate
shocks in the model, in clear violation of the empirical evidence.24 Related to this,
introducing liquidity shocks can account for the low R2 of regressions of the excess
return on the forward discount. While changes in exchange rates are predictable
by the forward discount, the extent of this predictive power is very limited, as
discussed in the Introduction.
The real value of Foreign bond investments by liquidity traders at time t is












We choose the process of liquidity trade to match two key features of the data.
First, we choose the magnitude of the shocks to match observed exchange rate
volatility in the data, which aﬀects optimal portfolios. Second, we choose the
polynomial C(L) such that in equilibrium the impact of these “noise” shocks on
24Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004, 2006) show that in the presence of heterogenous informa-
tion small liquidity shocks can have a large eﬀect on exchange rates movements, so that exchange
rates are disconnected from macroeconomic fundamentals. The exogenous “noise” that is gen-
erated by liquidity supply shocks can also be modeled endogenously, without any implications
for the results. See Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) in the context of the foreign exchange
market.
10t h ee x c h a n g er a t ei sv e r yp e r s i s t e n ta n dt h ee x c h a n g er a t ei sc l o s et oar a n d o m
walk, as widely documented. We will return to this below when discussing the
solution method. Apart from being realistic, this is also of importance in the
decision of whether to actively manage the portfolio each period or not. If there
were large predictable components to exchange rate changes, the gain from active
portfolio management would obviously be larger.
It is important to note that liquidity trade shocks do not contribute to excess
return predictability associated with the forward discount. The reason is that we
do not allow these shocks to aﬀects interest rates, either directly or indirectly.25
2.1.5 Market Clearing
We ﬁnally discuss the Foreign bond market clearing condition. There is a ﬁxed
supply B of Foreign bonds in the Foreign currency. The real supply of Foreign
bonds is Be−p∗
t = Best, where we normalized the Home price level at 1 (so that pt =
0). Investors are born with an endowment of one, but their wealth accumulates
over time. Let WI
t−j,t be the wealth at time t f o ra ni n v e s t o rb o r na tt−j.T h i si s














t−j+1,t +( x + xt) ¯ W = Be
st (8)
We will set ¯ x such that the steady state supply of Foreign bonds relative to
total ﬁnancial wealth, Be¯ s/ ¯ W,i se q u a lt ob, which is set exogenously. Without
loss of generality we will assume that the nominal supply B is such that this holds
for a zero steady state log exchange rate: ¯ s =0 .
Several non-linear terms show up in the market clearing condition. Portfolio
demand depends on the product of portfolio shares and wealth, with the latter
being a function of past portfolio shares and returns. The supply is also a non-
linear function of the log exchange rate. We linearize this budget constraint around
t h epo i n tw h e r et h el o ge x c h a n g er a t ea n da sset returns are zero and portfolio shares
25In a previous version of the paper, we assumed an interest rate rule reacting to the exchange
rate. In that context, liquidity trade contributes to the forward bias puzzle since liquidity shocks
are correlated with the interest rate. For this impact to be large, however, the interest rate must
be very sensitive to the exchange rate. This is the mechanism emphasized by McCallum (1994).
11are equal to their steady-state values. Details can be found in Appendix A.2 and
the Technical Appendix. We will think of liquidity demand shocks as equivalent to
exogenous supply shocks, so that the linearized net supply after dividing by steady
state wealth is bst − xt.
2.1.6 Solving the Model
From the market equilibrium condition, we can derive the equilibrium exchange
rate. The details of the solution method are discussed in Appendix A.2 and in
the Technical Appendix. Here we describe the main elements. We conjecture the






where A(L)=a1+a2L+... and B(L)=b1 +b2L+... are inﬁnite lag polynomials.
Conditional on this conjectured exchange rate equation we compute excess returns
as well as their ﬁrst and second moments that enter into the optimal portfolios.
O n ec a nt h e ns o l v ef o rt h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h epo l y n o m i a l sb yi m po s i n gt h el i n e a r i z e d
bond market equilibrium condition.
B u tr a t h e rt h a ns o l v i n gf o rA(L)a n dB(L) given the model and the process
for interest rate and supply shocks, we instead choose A(L), b1 and C(L) (process
of supply shocks) such the that (i) the Foreign bond market equilibrium condition
is satisﬁed and (ii) ˆ xt = B(L)²x
t follows an AR process:
ˆ xt = ρxˆ xt−1 + b1²
x
t (10)
The latter implies bi = ρi−1
x b1 for i>1. Rather than taking the process of supply
shocks as given, we therefore choose it such that the impact of these shocks on the
exchange rate will follow a highly persistent AR process.
As discussed in the Appendix, the parameter b1 and the parameters of the poly-
nomial A(L) can be solved jointly. Once b1 and A(L) are solved, the parameters of
the polynomial C(L) follow immediately from the market clearing condition. But
C(L) is not consequential for the rest of the analysis. Since the polynomial A(L)
has an inﬁnite number of parameters, and solving b1 and A(L) therefore requires
solving an inﬁnite number of non-linear equations, we truncate the polynomial
A(L)a f t e r¯ T lags. We set as =0f o rs>¯ T and solve b1,a 1,..,a ¯ T from ¯ T +1
12non-linear equations. Since interest rate shocks are temporary, their impact on
the exchange rate dies out anyway, making this approximation very precise for
large ¯ T.I np r a c t i c ew es e t¯ T so large that increasing it any further has negligible
eﬀect on the results.
2.2 On the Optimality of Infrequent Decision Making
So far we have exogenously assumed that traders make infrequent portfolio deci-
sions. We would like to know under what circumstances such a passive portfolio
management strategy is optimal. There is a trade-oﬀ between the higher expected
returns under active portfolio management and the cost involved. Assume that
the cost of active portfolio management is a fraction τ of wealth per period. The
question then is how large τ needs to be for it to be optimal for all traders to
make decisions infrequently. We will refer to the level of τ where expected util-
ity is the same under active and passive portfolio management strategies as the
threshold cost.A s l o n g a s τ is above this threshold, it is optimal for traders to
make infrequent portfolio decisions. For now we will assume that all traders face
the same cost τ. In the next section we will also consider a case where the cost
τ that agents face diﬀers across agents, so that it is possible that some choose to
actively manage their portfolio while others make infrequent portfolio decisions.
In order to determine the threshold cost, we must consider the alternative
where traders make portfolio decisions each period.26 An investor with an actively
managed portfolio must solve a more complicated multi-period portfolio decision
problem. Since equilibrium expected returns are time varying, the optimal dy-
namic portfolio contains a hedge against changes in future expected returns. A
technical contribution of the paper is to derive an explicit analytical solution to
the multi-period portfolio decision problem with time-varying expected returns.
Here we brieﬂy describe the method, leaving the details to Appendix A.1 and the
Technical Appendix.
We start by conjecturing that the value function at time t + s (s =0 ,..,T)o f






t+s /(1 − γ)( 1 1 )
26We will abstract from scenarios where agents make portfolio decisions at intervals between
one and T.
13Here Wt+s is wealth at t + s, Hs is a matrix and Yt+s is the state space. The
latter consists of Yt+s =( εu
t+s,..,εu
t+s+1− ¯ T, ˆ xt,1)0. Since in principle the state space
is inﬁnitely long, for tractability reasons we have truncated it after ¯ T periods,
with ¯ T very large. This in eﬀect means that agents ignore interest rate shocks
that happened a very long time ago. The key conjecture is that the term in the
exponential of the value function is quadratic in the state space.
At time t + s the optimal portfolio is chosen by maximizing Et+sVt+s+1.W e
ﬁrst substitute Wt+s+1 =( 1− τ)Wt+ser
p
t+s+1 into the expression for Vt+s+1,w h e r e
r
p
t+s+1 is a second order approximation of the log portfolio return from t + s to
t + s + 1. We then maximize with respect to the portfolio at t + s.W e s h o w
that Vt+s = EtVt+s+1 indeed takes the conjectured form in (11). Starting with the
known value function at t+T, Vt+T = W
1−γ
t+T /(1−γ), which corresponds to HT =0 ,
we then solve the value function for earlier periods with backward induction, until
we have computed the value function at time t.
The solution to this portfolio problem yields the following optimal portfolio
share invested in Foreign bonds at time t + s f o ra ni n v e s t o rb o r na tt i m et:
b
F
t,t+s = ¯ b
F(s)+
Et+s(qt+s+1)





The ﬁrst term, ¯ bF(s), is a constant. The second term depends on the expected
excess return over the next period. In the denominator σ2
F = vart(qt+1). The term
ˆ σ2
F(s)i sd e ﬁned in the Appendix but in practice is very close to vart(qt+1), so that
the denominator is close to γvart(qt+1). The third term is a hedging term that
captures a hedge against changes in future expected returns. Ds is a vector of
constant terms, so the hedge term is linear in the state space.
Assume that each new generation consists of nF agents that make frequent
portfolio decisions, actively managing their portfolio each period, and nI agents
















t−j+1,t +(¯ x + xt) ¯ W = Be
st (13)
where WF
t−j+1,t is the wealth at time t of agents born at time t−j+1 that actively
manage their portfolio.
14In section 3.3 we will consider the case where the fraction of agents that actively
manages their portfolio is positive. For now we focus on the case where it is
optimal for all agents to make infrequent portfolio decisions. In that case nF =0
in equilibrium and nI = n. T h i sw i l lb et h ec a s ea sl o n ga st h ec o s to fa c t i v e
portfolio management is higher than the threshold cost.
The threshold cost τ is determined such that the expected utility of an investor
who makes frequent portfolio decisions is the same as that of an investor who
makes infrequent portfolio decisions.27 A b o v ew eh a v ea l r e a d yd i s c u s s e dh o wt h e
value function is computed under active portfolio management. Since each investor
starts with wealth equal to 1, the value function at birth is eY 0
t H0Yt(1−τ)(1−γ)T/(1−
γ). For an investor making only one portfolio decision for T periods, the time t
value function is Vt = EtW
1−γ






maximization with respect to bI
t yields the optimal portfolio (12) and a time t
value function that takes the form eY 0
t HYt/(1 − γ). When born, investors need to
decide whether to actively manage their portfolio before observing the state Yt.28
We therefore compare the unconditional expectation of the time t value functions
for the two strategies, where the expectation is with respect to the unconditional
distribution of Yt. The threshold cost τ is such that expected utility is the same
under both strategies.
2.3 Parameterization
We calibrate the model to data for the ﬁve currencies on which Table 1 and Figure
1 are based. Consistent with the quarterly excess returns in Table 1 and Figure
1, a period is set equal to one quarter. The AR process for the forward discount,
and therefore ut, is estimated for the countries and sample period corresponding
to the excess return regression reported in Table 1.29 We set ρu and σu equal to
the average across the countries of the estimated processes. This yields ρu =0 .8
27The full details can be found in the Technical Appendix.
28In a more realistic framework where agents have inﬁnite lives and make portfolio decisions
every T periods, this corresponds to agents deciding on the frequency of portfolio decisions before
observing future states when portfolio decisions are actually made. In other words, it corresponds
to a time-dependent decision rule.
29We use three-month Euro-market interest rates from Datastream between December 1978
and December 2005.
15and σu =0 .0038.
The process for the supply xt = C(L)²x
t cannot be observed directly. We set
the standard deviation σx of the innovations to this process such that the implied
exchange rate volatility in the model matches that in the data. To be precise, σx is
set such that the standard deviation of st+1−st in the model is equal to the average
standard deviation of the one quarter change in the log exchange rate for the ﬁve
currencies and time period of the excess return regression reported in Table 1. The
average standard deviation is 0.057. We choose the polynomial C(L) such that
the exchange rate is close to a random walk, consistent with extensive empirical
evidence. To be precise, we choose C(L) such that ˆ xt f o l l o w sa nA Rp r o c e s sa si n
(10) with AR coeﬃcient ρx =0 .99. This means that the exchange rate is close to
a random walk since supply shocks dominate exchange rate volatility.
In the benchmark parameterization we set T =8 . T h i si m p l i e st h a ta g e n t s
make one portfolio decision in two years, so that half of the agents change their
portfolio during a particular year. While it is hard to calibrate this precisely to
the data, it corresponds well to evidenc ef o rt h es t o c km a r k e tr e p o r t e di nt h e
introduction indicating that only about 40% of investors change their stock or
mutual fund portfolios during any particular year. It also corresponds well to
evidence reported by Parker and Julliard (2005) and Jagannathan and Wang (2005)
that Euler equations for asset pricing better ﬁt the data when returns are measured
over longer horizons of one to three years. In section 4 we will further discuss that
evidence and its connection to our model.
The ﬁnal two parameters are b and γ.W e s e t b =0 .5, corresponding to a
two-country setup with half of the assets supplied by the US and the other half
b yt h er e s to ft h ew o r l d .T h er a t eo fr e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o ni ss e ta t1 0 .T h i si si n
the upper range of what Mehra and Prescott (1985) found to be consistent with
estimates from micro studies, but consistent with more recent estimates by Bansal
and Yaron (2004) and Vissing-Jorgenson and Attanasio (2003).30 Ar i s k - a v e r s i o n
of 10 also reduces the well known extreme sensitivity of portfolios to expected
excess returns in this type of model.31
30The estimates in Bansal and Yaron (2004) are based on a general equilibrium model that
can explain several well known asset pricing puzzles. The estimates in Vissing-Jorgenson and
Attanasio (2003) are based on estimating Euler equations based on consumption data for stock
market participants.
31Other ways to improve this feature include loss aversion preferences, habit formation pref-
163 Explaining the Forward Premium Puzzle
We now examine the model’s quantitative implications for excess return pre-
dictability. We will show that the model indeed generates such predictability.
We ﬁrst present the results in our benchmark case and provide the intuition on
the mechanism leading to predictability. We show that this is closely related to the
phenomenon of delayed overshooting. We then report the threshold cost of active
portfolio management such that investors are equally well oﬀ adopting a passive
or active portfolio management strategy. We show that the threshold cost is very
small and certainly below any reasonable value of the true cost of active portfolio
management. This justiﬁes the infrequent decision making by all investors.
While the model is able to explain excess return predictability, the regression
coeﬃcient in the excess return equation is smaller than in the data. We show that
we cannot match this moment even if we drastically change the values of γ and
T. Drawing on a large number of small sample simulations, we also show that the
diﬀerence with the data cannot be explained by small sample bias. However, we
report two potential explanations that quantitatively line up the model to the data.
First, when we simulate the model over 25-year samples, we obtain a wide range of
regression estimates. While the mean of the estimated predictability coeﬃcients is
less than in the data, a relatively large proportion of the regression coeﬃcients are
at least as large as in the data. Second, we show that we can match the estimated
coeﬃcient in the data when we additionally assume partial information processing.
Under partial information processing we consider the case where investors either
assume that the exchange rate is a random walk or only use the current interest
rate diﬀerential to optimally predict future exchange rates.
3.1 Benchmark Results
Panel A of Figure 3 reports results when regressing excess returns qt+s on the for-
ward discount fdt, similar to Figure 1. While standard models predict coeﬃcients
around the zero line, the model is able to generate negative coeﬃcients for small
values of s, followed by positive coeﬃcients for larger s. The usual one-period
erences, parameter uncertainty, transaction costs, and portfolio benchmarking. These would
substantially complicate the model though.
17ahead coeﬃcient is equal to -0.95. Panel B shows a scatter plot of interest rate
diﬀerentials against subsequent one-period excess returns for one simulation of the
model over 100 periods, which corresponds to 25 years. The scatter plot is sim-
ilar to what is found in the data as shown in Figure 2. The interest diﬀerential
predicts excess returns, but both in the model and the data the predictability is
largely out-shadowed by risk. To summarize, the benchmark parameterization de-
livers signiﬁcant excess return predictability in the right direction, but the extent
of the predictability is less than in the data. In the data the regression coeﬃcient
is close to -2.5. We will now give some intuition both for why this predictability
occurs and what limits the extent of the predictability.
Delayed Overshooting
Figure 4 provides the key intuition behind our ﬁndings. Panel A shows the
impulse response of the exchange rate to a one standard deviation decrease in the
Foreign interest rate. It compares the benchmark case with the case where all
investors make portfolio decisions each period. In the latter case there is standard
overshooting, i.e., the lower Foreign interest rate causes an immediate appreciation
of the Home currency, followed by a gradual depreciation. In that case the excess
return predictability coeﬃcient is close to zero (-0.014).32 With infrequent portfolio
decisions, however, we ﬁnd delayed overshooting, consistent with the empirical
ﬁndings of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). The initial appreciation is now smaller,
but the Home currency continues to appreciate in the following several quarters,
after which it starts to gradually depreciate.
The continued appreciation is a result of the delayed portfolio response of in-
vestors. Investors making portfolio decisions at the time the shock occurs sell
Foreign bonds in response to the news of a lower Foreign interest rate. The next
period a diﬀerent set of investors adjust their portfolio. They too will sell Foreign
bonds in response to the lower interest rate, leading to a continued appreciation
of the Home currency. The currency continues to appreciate for three quarters.
Panel B shows the evolution of the forward discount and the excess return
(computed using the path of the exchange rate in Panel A). The Figure shows
that initially the drop in the excess return is larger than the rise in the forward
32The fact that it is not exactly zero is because the change in the exchange rate changes the
real supply of the foreign asset, Be−st, which has a small risk-premium eﬀect.
18discount. The reason is that the excess return st+1 − st − fdt decreases both
because of the rise in the forward discount (lower Foreign interest rate) and the
subsequent appreciation of the Home currency (negative change in the exchange
rate). However, the Figure also shows that this is not long-lasting. Within three
quarters the absolute decline in the excess return is less than the rise in the forward
discount and at T = 8 quarters they both go in the same direction. This limits the
magnitude of the negative excess return predictability coeﬃcient. Related to that,
the delayed overshooting in panel A only lasts 3 quarters, while Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995) report empirical evidence indicating delayed overshooting lasting for
two to three years.
The reason why the delayed overshooting does not last longer than 3 quarters is
that at that point investors start buying Foreign bonds again. Investors know that
the Foreign interest rate will continue to be lower than the Home interest rate, but
they also realize that eventually the Home currency will depreciate. The reason
is that the investors who sold Foreign bonds at the time the shock happened
will increase their holdings of Foreign bonds 8 quarters later when they adjust
their portfolio again.33 After all, the interest rate diﬀerential in favor of Home
bonds is expected to be much smaller 8 quarters later. Three periods after the
shock the expected depreciation of the Home currency over the next 8 quarters is
suﬃcient to more than oﬀset the expected interest diﬀerentials in favor of the Home
bonds. Investors will then start buying Foreign bonds again, causing the Home
currency to gradually depreciate. This of course assumes very careful forward
looking behavior on the part of investors, processing all available information to
predict the exchange rate two years into the future. This information processing
capacity may be unrealistic, an issue to which we will turn below.
Threshold Cost
Following the method described in section 2.2, we ﬁnd an annualized threshold
cost of 0.27% of wealth. This means that it is indeed optimal for all investors to
make infrequent portfolio decisions when the cost of active portfolio management is
at least 0.27% of wealth. This number is far below fees charged by active portfolio
managers, which do not even include additional agency and monitoring costs when
33More precisely, and leading to the same outcome, they are replaced by a new generation that
chooses a new portfolio.
19delegating these decisions to fund managers and the transactions costs associated
with frequent portfolio adjustments.
The reason that the threshold cost is so small is that there is so much uncer-
tainty about future returns. Since the component of the exchange rate that de-
pends on supply shocks is close to a random walk, virtually the entire predictability
comes from interest rates. Panel B of Figure 3 illustrates that the predictability of
excess returns by interest diﬀerentials is simply overwhelmed by uncertainty, as is
the case in the data. Therefore only a small cost of active portfolio management
is suﬃcient for investors to not actively exploit the predictability.
Small Sample Results
In order to allow for better comparison to results based on the data reported
in Table 1 and Figure 1, we have also simulated a 25-year period for the model.
Based on 1000 simulations of a 25-year period, we ﬁnd that the average excess
return predictability is very close to the population moment of -0.95. This means
that there cannot be a systematic small sample bias. However, the excess return
predictability varies quite considerably across simulations. This is consistent with
empirical evidence that shows that the excess return coeﬃcient tends to be unstable
over time. Panel A of Figure 5 reports the frequency distribution. In 12% of cases
we ﬁnd an excess return predictability coeﬃcient of less than -2. This means that
the ﬁndings in the data are well within reach of the model.34
Panel B reports the average of the regression coeﬃcients of qt+s on fdt (s =
1,..,30) for the 10% of simulations (100 simulations) generating the lowest coeﬃ-
cient for s = 1. The picture is very similar to Figure 1 based on the data. The
average predictability coeﬃcient is -2.6 for s = 1. It continues to be negative for
about six quarters, dropping in absolute size as s increases.
Alternative Parameterizations
Table 2 presents results on the one-period ahead predictability coeﬃcient and
t h et h r e s h o l dc o s tf o rs o m ea l t e r n a t i v ev a l u e so ft h er a t eo fr i s ka v e r s i o nγ and
the frequency T of decision making. The excess return predictability coeﬃcient
is larger for higher values of γ and T, but not enough to match the data. Based
34In contrast, the probability of this being the case is only 1.1% when all investors make
portfolio decisions each period.
20on population moments generated by the model, it is not possible to match the
empirical estimate of about −2.5 even when we substantially increase γ and T.I t
remains the case though that for a large range of parameters there is a substan-
tial probability that the excess return predictability coeﬃcient is less than -2 in
simulations of a 25-year period.
We also see that the threshold cost remains quite low for a wide range of
parameters. It is highest for a low rate of risk-aversion of γ =1s i n c ea g e n t sa r e
then less averse to the risk associated with exploiting excess return predictability.
3.2 Partial Information Processing
Although investors in the model make infrequent portfolio decisions, we have as-
sumed that they use all available information when they make those decisions. In
other words, investors have rational expectations and are able to determine the
future behavior of other investors and the full path of future returns based on all
information available today. As explained above, it is this forward looking behav-
ior that leads investors to start buying Foreign bonds after three periods, which
limits the extent of delayed overshooting.
However, as shown in the rational inattention literature, in the presence of
costly information processing it may be optimal for investors to only process partial
information.35 Such partial information processing also corresponds better to the
description of the actual behavior of investors. For example, investors may simply
rely on the Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) evidence that no simple model can beat the
random walk to predict nominal exchange rates. Many large ﬁnancial institutions
do not bother to try to outperform the random walk when forming expectations
of the exchange rate one month or more into the future. If they do, they tend to
use very simple forecasting rules.36
35Consistent with that Fama (1991) suggests that “a weaker and economically more sensible
version of the eﬃcient market hypothesis says that prices reﬂect information to the point where
the marginal beneﬁts of acting on information do not exceed the marginal cost”.
36Kasa (2006) shows that such behavior can be optimal even in the absence of information
processing costs. He presents an example where robust ﬁltering theory and Shannon capacity
constraints are observationally equivalent. In other words, introducing a limited information pro-
cessing capacity in a framework where agents know the model is equivalent to introducing model
uncertainty. There is an equivalence between using partial information with limited information
21We will consider two relevant cases of partial information processing. In the
ﬁrst case investors form optimal expectations of future spot exchange rates and
interest rates on the basis of only current interest rates. They do not use all past
interest rates and liquidity supply shocks to form expectations. Investors therefore
optimally exploit the ﬁndings from excess return predictability regressions reported
in Figure 1, which only have current interest rate diﬀerentials on the right hand
side. In the second case investors continue to predict future interest rates on the
bases of current interest rates, based on the AR process, but they expect future
spot rates to be equal to the current spot rate.37 We will focus on the ﬁrst case
and brieﬂy mention the results for the random walk assumption towards the end.
More Predictability
Figure 6 shows the main results. We keep all the parameters as in the bench-
mark parameterization. The usual one-period ahead regression coeﬃcient of the
excess return on the forward discount is now -2.1. This is close to the average
regression coeﬃcient found in the data and reported in Table 1. Panel A of Figure
6 shows that the coeﬃcient continues to be negative for 5 quarters, declining in
absolute size, then turns positive and eventually back to zero for very long lags.
This closely matches the data reported in Figure 1.38 Panel C shows the frequency
distribution of the one-period ahead predictability coeﬃcient, again based on 100
simulations of a 25-year period. In 41% of simulations the coeﬃcient is now less
than -2.5. Panel B shows that a scatter plot of excess return observations versus
the forward discount, based on a 25-year simulation of the model, is again very
similar to what we found in the data reported in Figure 1.
More Delayed Overshooting
T h em o r en e g a t i v er e g r e s s i o nc o e ﬃcient with partial information processing can
processing capacity and only using robust information with model uncertainty.
37While this second case is very attractive in the context of the widely reported diﬃculties in
outperforming the random walk, and the actual practice by many investors, it has the theoret-
ical ﬂaw that investors use current interest rates to predict future interest rates but not future
exchange rates.
38In the data this coeﬃcient continues to be negative for about 10 quarters, but its coeﬃcient
is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero after about 5 quarters. Also, the decline of this coeﬃcient
back to zero in the data happens after 30 quarters, not reported in Figure 1.
22be explained by more delayed overshooting. Panel A of Figure 7 shows that after a
drop in the Foreign interest rate, the Home currency appreciates for eight quarters.
In contrast to the full information case, investors continue to sell Foreign bonds
for eight quarters. The expected excess return over 8 quarters is now proportional
to the interest rate diﬀerential, with a coeﬃcient of β1 + .. + β8,w h e r eβs is the
regression coeﬃcient in qt+s = αs + βsfdt.T h es u mo ft h eﬁrst eight coeﬃcients
is -2.6. This means that the expected excess return over the next eight quarters
is -2.6 times the current forward discount. Investors therefore will continue to sell
Foreign bonds during the ﬁrst eight quarters when the lower Foreign interest rate
raises the forward discount. After eight quarters investors start buying Foreign
bonds again because the ﬁrst group of investors selling Foreign bonds when the
shock happened is replaced by another generation. Foreign bonds are by then more
attractive than they were eight quarters earlier since the interest rate on Foreign
bonds has gradually increased over time.
Under full information processing the expected eight-period depreciation of the
exchange rate gradually rises after the shock because investors know that the de-
layed overshooting (appreciation phase) is temporary. This leads them to switch
from selling Foreign bonds to buying Foreign bonds quite soon, so that the de-
layed overshooting does not last so long. But under partial information processing
investors do not condition their expectations on the entire history. The expected
depreciation over the next eight quarters is only conditioned on the current interest
diﬀerential. Because the interest diﬀerential is declining over time, the expected
depreciation of the home currency over the next eight quarters is also declining
with it, quite the opposite of what happens under full information processing.39
Threshold Cost
The choice to process partial information is fully rational when the cost of full
information processing outweighs the beneﬁts. Therefore we like to know under
what cost of information processing it is optimal to form expectations only based
on the current interest rate rather than the full information set. We ﬁnd that when
this cost is at least 0.58% of wealth on an annualized basis, it remains optimal for
investors to only base expectations on the current interest rate. Since this is quite
small, an equilibrium based on partial information processing appears reasonable.
39The expected eight-period depreciation is 1.58 times the forward discount.
23We can now also again ask what the threshold cost of active portfolio man-
agement is. In doing so we will assume that under active portfolio management
expectations of future excess returns are also based only on the current interest
rate. We then ﬁnd that the annualized threshold cost is 0.68%.
Two Final Comments
Two ﬁnal comments are in order. First, when investors assume that the ex-
change rate follows a random walk we ﬁnd a one-period ahead excess return coef-
ﬁcient that is even somewhat more negative, -2.54. In that case investors continue
to sell Foreign bonds to an even greater extent over the ﬁrst eight periods because
they do not expect the domestic currency to depreciate at any time in the future.
There continues to be delayed overshooting for eight periods in this case. Second,
partial information processing by itself does not generate much excess return pre-
dictability. If all investors make portfolio decisions each period, using only current
interest rates to forecast future excess returns, the one-period ahead excess return
predictability coeﬃcient would be -0.07.
3.3 Investors with Actively Managed Portfolios
We now introduce investors with actively managed portfolios into the model. As
discussed in the introduction, the current size of the industry that actively manages
short-term currency positions is tiny. The assumption that we have made so far,
that no investors actively manage their currency positions, is therefore currently
(and certainly over the past 25 years) a good approximation. Nonetheless this
market does exist and has been growing substantially in recent years. A natural
question is therefore how large this market needs to become in order for it to start
eroding the excess return predictability.
In order for some investors to choose to have their currency positions actively
managed, while others choose not to do so, there must be some diﬀerence across
investors. It is possible that investors diﬀer in their expectations of excess returns,
perceptions of risk, degree of risk-aversion or the covariance of currency speculation
returns with returns on other ﬁnancial positions they hold. To simplify, here we
assume that the cost of active portfolio management diﬀers across investors. One
group faces a cost of active portfolio management below the threshold, while the
24other group faces a cost above the threshold. To the extent that fees depend on
the amount of capital invested, the ﬁrst group would consist of traders with larger
investments.
As already reported above, as the proportion of investors that make frequent
portfolio decisions goes to 1, predictability disappears. Panel A of Figure 8 shows
how the predictability coeﬃcient changes when the proportion of investors with
actively managed portfolios goes from 0 to 10%. Both cases of full and partial
information are shown. In the latter case all investors form expectations based
on current interest rates. Panel B reports the threshold cost such that expected
utility is the same for actively and passively managed portfolios.
Figure 8 shows that the excess return predictability coeﬃcient drops signiﬁ-
cantly in absolute size as the fraction f of investors with actively managed port-
folios increases. The model still generates substantial excess return predictability
when 1% of wealth is actively managed. This corresponds to 2% of steady state
external ﬁnancial holdings in the model, or about seven times the current size of
the industry that actively manages currency positions (0.3% of external holdings).
It is therefore not likely that the forward discount predictability will disappear any
time soon.
When 10% of ﬁnancial wealth is actively managed the excess return predictabil-
ity is signiﬁcantly reduced. This is not surprising as investors with actively man-
aged portfolios devote signiﬁcant resources towards exploiting excess return pre-
dictability. Even with a rate of risk aversion of 10, these investors are very aggres-
sive. With an excess return predictability coeﬃcient of -2.5 (as in the data), a two
standard deviation increase in the Foreign interest rate will lead active investors
to increase their holdings of Foreign bonds from a steady state of 50% of wealth
to 132% of wealth.
There is a natural limit to the size of the industry that actively manages cur-
rency positions. This is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 8. It shows that the
threshold cost declines rapidly as the fraction of actively managedw e a l t hi n c r e a s e s .
This is not surprising because of the reduction in excess return predictability. The
proﬁt opportunities left unexploited go down with the increase in actively managed
portfolios. It would therefore not be optimal for too many investors to actively
manage their currency positions.
254 Discussion
In this section, we relate the previous analysis to three distinct aspects of the
existing literature on the forward premium puzzle. First, how does the model con-
nect to risk-premium based explanations of the forward discount puzzle? Second,
how does the model relate to survey evidence of predictable expectational errors?
Third, how can the model shed light on a variety of other stylized facts associated
with excess return predictability in the foreign exchange market?
Connection to Risk Premium Explanations
The standard assumption in ﬁnance is that expected excess returns reﬂect a
risk premium.40 This assumes that agents continuously rethink the optimality of
their portfolios. In this paper we have deviated from this by considering the im-
plications of infrequent decisions about portfolios due to a cost of making such
decisions. However, this does not mean that the model is completely disconnected
from risk-premium explanations. First, in section 3.3 we have introduced investors
who do make decisions each period. From the perspective of these investors the
expected excess return is identical to a risk premium. The risk premium is neg-
atively correlated with the forward discount, which is what is needed to get a
negative coeﬃcient when regressing the excess return on the forward discount. A
higher Foreign interest rate, which lowers the forward discount, raises the fraction
invested in Foreign bonds. This increases the dependence of next period’s wealth
on the excess return of Foreign bonds and therefore raises the risk premium.
It should be emphasized though that it is the infrequent decision making by
the great majority of investors that generates this time varying risk premium. As
a result of passive portfolio management, a higher Foreign interest rate leads to an
expected appreciation of the Foreign currency, leading active investors to increase
their holdings of Foreign bonds and therefore an increase in the risk premium they
demand. In the absence of passive investors, the higher Foreign interest rate would
be followed by an expected depreciation of the Foreign currency, so that investors
making frequent portfolio decisions would change their holdings of Foreign bonds
40In the context of the foreign exchange market Engel (1996) reviews explanations for the
forward discount puzzle based on time varying risk premia. For more recent contributions, see
Backus et al. (2001), Beakert et al. (1997) and Verdelhan (2005).
26very little and the change in the risk premium would be very small.
Second, there is also a risk premium for investors making infrequent portfolio
decisions. For those investors a T-period Euler equation applies:
Et(ct+T)
−γqt,t+T =0 ( 1 4 )
where ct+T is consumption at t + T. The standard asset pricing equation equates
the expected product of the pricing kernel and excess return to zero. In that
case the pricing kernel is the marginal utility of consumption next period and the
excess return is also measured over one period. For investors making infrequent
portfolio decisions the only diﬀerence is that the pricing kernel is the marginal
utility of consumption T periods from now and the excess return is measured over
T periods. The risk premium for passive investors therefore applies over T periods
and is equal to the rate of risk aversion times the covariance of the excess return
over T periods and consumption in T periods. For these investors the one-period
excess return cannot be associated with a risk premium.
There is evidence that long-horizon Euler equations indeed ﬁt the data bet-
ter than short-horizon Euler equations. Recently Jagannathan and Wang (2005)
and Parker and Julliard (2005) have provided such evidence for stock returns.
Jagganathan and Wang (2005) show that the Euler equation ﬁts the data sub-
stantially better at a one-year horizon than a monthly horizon. They argue that
infrequent portfolio and consumption decisions can account for this. Parker and
Juliard (2005) use stock return data to estimate an Euler equation where excess
returns are measured over one quarter but consumption growth over multiple quar-
ters. They ﬁnd that the Euler equation ﬁts the data best with consumption growth
measured over three years. They argue that one reason for this may be the “pres-
ence of constraints on information ﬂow” and refer to a literature where agents
make infrequent portfolio decisions.
Survey Evidence of Predictable Expectational Errors
Many papers on the forward discount puzzle argue that the bias must be the
result of either time varying risk-premia or predictable expectational errors (e.g.
Froot and Frankel, 1989). The logic of this argument is based on the assumption
that all agents make active portfolio decisions each period. In that case the ex-
pected excess return is equal to a risk premium and the actual excess return is
27equal to a risk premium plus expectational error. The bias therefore results from
either the risk premium or the expectational error being negatively correlated with
the forward discount. This decomposition is no longer valid in our model since the
Euler equation does not apply on a periodic basis for investors making infrequent
portfolio decisions.
Evidence of predictable expectational errors is nonetheless consistent with the
ﬁndings of the model. For example, when agents assume that the exchange rate
follows a random walk, the expectational error of the change in the exchange rate
is predicted negatively by the forward discount. This is consistent with extensive
evidence based on survey data.41 More generally, evidence of predictable expec-
tational errors is consistent with partial information processing. Since there is
evidence of predictable expectational errors for large ﬁnancial institutions, one
would certainly expect that individual investors process only a limited amount of
information when making portfolio decisions.
Extensions
Several other stylized facts related to the forward discount puzzle have been
documented in the literature. The model proposed in this paper certainly cannot
account for all of them. However, the analysis can be extended to deal with several
of the additional features. We brieﬂy mention three of them.
First, we could introduce long-term bonds. The model would then replicate the
empirical evidence showing that the forward discount puzzle tends to go away over
long horizons. Meridith and Chinn (2005) provide such evidence using regressions
of the change in the exchange rate over a long horizon of 5 or 10 years on the inter-
est rate diﬀerential for long-term bonds with corresponding maturity. They ﬁnd
coeﬃcients of respectively 0.67 and 0.68. Without introducing long-term bonds
we can conduct a closely related exercise of regressing the average excess return
on foreign currency investments over T p e r i o d so nt h ef o r w a r dd i s c o u n ta tt i m et.
The resulting coeﬃcient is the average of the coeﬃcients βs of the excess return
regressions qt+s = αs+βsfdt+k +εt+s,f o rs from 1 to T. Both in the model and in
the data these average predictability coeﬃcients gradually decline in absolute size
41See Froot and Frankel (1989). Bacchetta, Mertens, and van Wincoop (2006) review subse-
quent papers and present the latest evidence.
28as T increases and are close to zero when T =2 0( 5y e a r s ) .
A second extension is to modify the monetary policy rules in order to introduce
persistent inﬂation shocks. This will allow the model to account for evidence by
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) that there is less excess return predictability for
developing countries. Consider for example a change in Home country’s monetary
policy from a zero inﬂation target to a 10% inﬂation target. The only change that
this generates in the model is in the steady state. There will now be a constant
10% steady state depreciation and the Homei n t e r e s tr a t ew i l lb e1 0 %h i g h e r .I n
deviation from this steady state the solution is the same as before. Such a change
in policy therefore raises both st+1 − st and fdt by the same large amounts. One
can therefore expect that persistent inﬂation shocks in the model will lead to a
much higher coeﬃcient in a regression of st+1 − st on fdt.
A third extension is to introduce transactions costs. As extensively discussed in
Sarno, Valente and Leon (2006), their ﬁnding of non-linearities in the relationship
between excess return predictability and the size of the interest rate diﬀerential
can naturally be explained by introducing these costs. This leads to a band of
inaction.42 When interest rate diﬀerentials are small, the gains from trading on
t h ee x p e c t e de x c e s sr e t u r nm a yn o to u t w e i g ht h et r a n s a c t i o nc o s t ,s ot h a tt h e
excess return remains predictable. But when the interest rate diﬀerential gets
large enough active traders will take aggressive positions to exploit excess return
predictability. Since introducing transaction costs will further reduce the welfare
gain from active portfolio management, it provides a reinforcing motive for making
infrequent portfolio decisions.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The model of incomplete information processing developed in the paper can shed
light on many key empirical stylized facts related to the forward premium puz-
zle. First, it can explain why the amount of capital devoted to actively managing
42See Baldwin (1990) and the discussion in Lyons (2001, 206-220). A transaction cost of
exchanging home bonds for foreign bonds is quite diﬀerent from limited participation models
where there is a transaction cost of exchanging bonds for money, the latter used for consumption.
Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2005) use such a model to shed light on the forward discount puzzle.
In their model all agents can exchange all bonds at no cost.
29short-term currency positions is tiny. The welfare gain from active management of
currency positions is very small since exchange rates are notoriously hard to pre-
dict. These welfare gains are easily outweighed by a small cost of active portfolio
management. Second, infrequent decisions by investors about currency exposures
lead to a delayed impact of interest rate shocks on exchange rates. This can explain
the phenomenon of “delayed overshooting,” whereby the exchange rate continues
to appreciate over time after a rise in the interest rate. Third, the delayed over-
shooting gives rise to excess return predictability of a magnitude consistent with
that seen in the data. Fourth, even future excess returns continue to be predictable
by the current forward discount, with the magnitude of the predictability declining
as time goes on.
Qualitatively similar models can also be developed to account for excess return
predictability in other ﬁnancial markets. For the stock market there is extensive
evidence that most investors make infrequent portfolio decisions, in particular
when reallocating between stocks and other assets. And in parallel to the delayed
overshooting evidence for the foreign exchange market, it is widely documented
that stock prices respond with delay to new publicly available information. Stock
prices continue to move in the same direction six to twelve months after public
events such as earnings announcements, stock issues and repurchases and dividend
initiations and omissions.43
The model developed here is obviously very stylized. Reality is far more com-
plex, with a much larger information space, time-varying model parameters, uncer-
tainty about the nature of the model itself and information asymmetries between
investors and agents. A richer model would therefore provide a more solid foun-
dation for existing costs of actively managing portfolios. However, it is not clear
that the main ﬁndings would change. First, the mechanism through which delayed
overshooting happens in the model would similarly apply in far more complex
environments. Second, the gains from frequent portfolio decisions would remain
s m a l li na n ym o d e lt h a tc a p t u r e st h ew e l lk n o w nd i ﬃculty of predicting changes
in exchange rates.
43See Hong and Stein (1999) for references. The literature is most extensive regarding continued
stock price appreciation subsequent to a positive earnings announcement, which has become
known as “post earnings announcement drift.”
30AA p p e n d i x
In this Appendix, we sketch the main steps to derive the portfolios of both investors
making frequent and infrequent portfolio decisions and to solve the model. More
details can be found in a Technical Appendix available upon request.
A.1 Optimal Portfolios
We ﬁrst describe how we derive the optimal of portfolio (5) of investors making
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We adopt a second order approximation for the log return:
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I is deﬁn e di n( 6 ) .
For investors making frequent portfolio decisions the optimal portfolio is more
complex since it involves a hedge against changes in future investment opportuni-
ties. Consider an agent born at time t. We will compute the optimal portfolio and
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where Hs is a square matrix of size ¯ T +2 .
We know that




We again adopt a second order approximation for the log return:
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F is the conditional variance of next period’s excess return. After substi-
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After substituting (24)-(25) into (23) we can compute Et+sevt+s+1. Maximizing
the resulting time t + s value function with respect to bF
t+s yields the optimal
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A.2 Solving the Equilibrium Exchange Rate
Consider the market equilibrium condition (13). The case where all investors
make infrequent portfolio decisions( e q .( 8 ) )i se a s i l yf o u n db ys e t t i n gnF =0a n d
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Steady state ﬁnancial wealth is deﬁned as total ﬁnancial wealth when the re-
turns on Home and Foreign bonds are equal to their steady state levels (¯ r for Home
bonds and 0 for Foreign bonds), τ = 0 and the fraction invested in Foreign bonds
is b. Based on that deﬁnition we have











p =( 1− b)e
¯ r + b (35)
The constant term in the portfolio of liquidity traders, ¯ x,i ss e ts u c ht h a tt h e
market clearing condition holds in steady state for a given real interest rate ¯ r.
Finally, we subtract the steady state from both sides of (32), we divide it by nT,
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33where f = nF/n is the fraction of agents making frequent portfolio decisions, the
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F(j − 1) + σ2
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We conjecture (9) with
A(L)=a1 + a2L + a3L
2 + ... (37)
B(L)=b1 + b2L + b3L
2 + ... (38)
Substituting (9) into the market equilibrium condition (36), we obtain an equi-
librium exchange rate equation. We then need to equate the conjectured to the
equilibrium exchange rate equation. We choose the process
xt = C(L)²
x




such that ˆ xt = B(L)²x
t follows the AR process (10). We normalize such that c1 =1 .
We therefore choose A(L), b1 and C(L) such the that (i) the Foreign bond
market equilibrium condition (36) is satisﬁed and (ii) ˆ xt = B(L)²x
t follows the AR
process in (10). The latter implies imposing bs+1 = ρxbs for s ≥ 1. Imposing
the market equilibrium condition involves computing ﬁrst and second moments
of excess returns based on the conjectured exchange rate process. After that is
done both sides of the market equilibrium equation can be written as a linear
function of the underlying innovations at time t a n de a r l i e r . W et h e nn e e dt o
equate the coeﬃcients multiplying these innovations on the right and left side of
the equation, which involves solving a ﬁxed point problem. The overall approach
is rather straightforward, but the algebra is a bit lengthy and can be found in the
Technical Appendix.
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41Table 1: Predictable Excess Returns
qt+1 = α + β(it − i∗
t)+²t+1
Currencies βσ (β) R2
DEM -1.8344** 0.8189 0.05
GBP -2.9537*** 1.1214 0.10
JPY -4.0626*** 0.7438 0.16
CND -1.5467*** 0.5305 0.05
CHF -2.3815*** 0.8068 0.09
EW Average -2.5558*** 0.6192 0.09
GDP Average -2.9821*** 0.6223 0.11
Note: qt+1 = ∆st+1 −(it −i
∗
t). ∆st+1 refers to the 3-month change in the log exchange rate. The exchange
rate is measured as net-of-period rate from IFS. Interest rates are 3-month rates as quoted in the London
Euromarket and were obtained from Datastream (Thomson Financial). *** and ** denote signiﬁcance at
respectively the 1% and 5% level. SUR system estimated from 109 quarterly observations over sample from
December 1978 to December 2005. Newey-West standard errors with 1 lag. “EW Average” refers to the
equally weighted average of the regression coeﬃcients. The last row reports the GDP weighted average.
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis
parameters predictability frequency (%) β < −2i n f o r m a t i o n
coeﬃcient β in in simulations processing
qt+1 = α + βfdt 25-year period costs (%)
benchmark -0.95 12 0.27
(γ = 10, T =8 )
γ =1 - 0 . 4 9 4 1 . 1 2
γ = 50 -1.16 18 0.06
T =4 - 0 . 5 5 5 0 . 1 3
T = 12 -1.12 15 0.33Figure 1: Forecasting Slopes






























Note: Slopes ¯k of regressing qt+k = ® + ¯k(it ¡ i¤
t) + ut+k for each currency. Thin lines are
standard error bands (+/- 2 s.e.). Same quarterly data as in Table 1. \GDP-AVG" is the
GDP weighted average of the ¯ve currencies ¯k.Figure 2: Predictability of Excess Return on DEM
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Panel A:  Regression coefficient of qt+s on fdt








-0.016 -0.012 -0.008 -0.004 0 0.004 0.008 0.012
Panel B:  Simulation of 25-year period: excess return 
and forward discount
s Forward Discount
Excess ReturnFigure 4  Impulse Responses to Interest Rate Shock under Benchmark Parameterization*
*Panel A shows the impulse response of the log exchange rate to a one standard deviation interest rate shock (decrease in the foreign interest rate)         
for both the benchmark parameterization and the case where all investors make frequent portfolio decisions. Panel B shows the forward discount and 
excess return under the benchmark parameterization in response to the same shock.
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Panel C: Frequency distribution of regression coefficient of 








1 6 11 16 21 26
Panel D: Average regression coefficient of qt+s on fdt






-5.0 -4.1 -3.1 -2.2 -1.3 -0.3 0.6Figure 7  Impulse Responses to Interest Rate Shock under Partial Information Processing
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